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Abstract 
 
Strategic Niche Management and Transition Management have been promoted as useful 
avenues to pursue in order to achieve both specific product or process changes and system 
transformation by focusing on technology development through evolutionary and co-
evolutionary processes, guided by government and relevant stakeholders. However, these 
process are acknowledged to require decades to achieve their intended changes, a timeframe 
that is too long for many of the environmental and social issues we are facing. An approach that 
involves incumbents and does not consider targets that look beyond reasonably foreseeable 
technology is likely to advance a model where incumbents evolve rather than being replaced or 
displaced. Sustainable development requires both disruptive technological and institutional 
changes, the latter including stringent regulation, integration beyond coordination of disparate 
goals, and changes in incentives to enable new voices to contribute to integrated systems and 
solutions. This paper outlines options for a strong governmental role in setting future 
sustainability goals and the pathways for achieving them. 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper traces the strengths and weaknesses of the evolutionary/co-evolutionary processes 
of Transition Management (TM) and Strategic Niche Management (SNM) in achieving 
sustainable development. These approaches mirror Ecological Modernization (EM) in their 
focus on learning processes within the firm and among firms in an evolving technological regime 
which hope to change and accelerate innovation processes in order to achieve more 
sustainable technologies (Ashford, 2002a). Their proponents reject revolutionary and disruptive 
changes brought on by government fiat (Rotmans, Kemp and van Asselt, 2001a), although, 
curiously, in earlier work some of them acknowledged the potential of regulation to change 
technological trajectories dramatically (Schot, Hoogma and Elzen, 1994). 
 
This paper argues that regulation-induced technological innovation has a much greater potential 
in making the significant changes required to achieving sustainable development by 
encouraging disrupting innovation, especially from new entrants displacing incumbents. TM and 
SNM processes are argued to be “too little, too late.” Nowhere is this more evident than in the 
area of global climate disruption. Attempts in the Netherlands to coach more sustainable energy 
production and use through TM and SNM are contrasted with President Obama’s new climate 
change initiative by regulating emissions from coal-fired power plants. Progress that is too little 
and too late has been made internationally through evolutionary processes. It is time to embark 
on a different pathway. 
 
Unsustainable systems, such as energy production and use, agriculture, and transportation 
consist of inter-connected components and economic actors characterized by technical (and 
political) “lock-in” [1] which is difficult to change. Strategic stringent regulation of those 
components, if conceived in an integrated fashion, are argued to be a more successful pathway 
to sustainability, even if greeted by political resistance.  
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In the remainder of this paper, we address the theories of system innovation, the strengths and 
weaknesses of the TM and SNM approaches, the argument in favor of a stronger role for 
government than mere guidance, regulation-induced technological innovation as a more viable 
alternative to achieving more sustainable development, and finally the importance of diffusion 
(as opposed to innovation) in achieving sustainable development. The debates of which 
approaches are more likely to succeed predictably reflect the disciplinary orientations of the 
opposing camps, centering around evolutionary, neoclassical, and ecological economists, and 
sociologists, on the one hand, and legal scholars and political scientists on the other. So-called 
technology policy experts occupy both domains.  
 
Theories of System Innovation 
 
When we move beyond product and process innovation into system changes, in addition to the 
wide range of instruments that can be used to guide technological development (in the product 
and process contexts), there are a number of theories that describe the process of technological 
innovation. Box 1 shows how the various schools of economic, historical, and sociological 
thought differ in their approaches to conceptualizing technological development. The description 
of these approaches draws on the work of Luiten (2001), Moors (2000), and Partidario (2003). 
In each description, the role of government is identified. 
 
The theories of technological innovation shown in Box 1 provide an indication why focusing on 
government intervention in the process of technological innovation is important, even 
necessary. In addition, although the policy instruments above have been listed in a general 
form, we should recognize that the success of a particular instrument in directing or stimulating 
technological development is context sensitive (Wallace, 1995). 
 
Understanding the role of societal (or cultural) change and how new technology forms can 
regulate social behavior is essential (Winner, 1977, 1986, 1992). If society is unwilling to accept 
(or buy) a new technology, then that technology will not be diffused sufficiently to affect the 
overall system (unless it is imposed by regulation). It is also important to consider whether new 
forms of technology are supporting the satisfaction of fundamental human needs for (1) safety, 
security, and sustenance; (2) competence, efficacy, and self-esteem; (3) autonomy and 
authenticity; and (4) connectedness (Kasser, 2002). Indeed, because meeting human needs lies 
at the center of sustainable development, perhaps greater attention should be paid to the impact 
of technology on needs fulfillment. 
 
Asking whether a new technology form is likely to be diffused sufficiently to affect the overall 
system is critical for sustainable development. In Europe, and more specifically in the 
Netherlands [2], there is a growing body of research that looks into how society can transition 
(that is, transform) to sustainable forms of development through system innovation (Elzen, 
Geels and Green, 2004; Kemp and Rotmans, 2005; Grin, Rotmans and Schot, 2010; Elzen, 
2002).  
  
A “transition” (or transformation) is described as “a long-term change process in an important 
sub-system encompassing various functional systems (for example, food production and 
consumption, mobility, energy supply and use, etc.) in which both the technical and the 
social/cultural dimensions of such systems change drastically” (Elzen, 2002, p. 1). A “system 
innovation” is described as “a set of innovations combined in order to provide a service in a 
novel way or offering new services. System innovations involve a new logic (guiding principle) 
and new types of practices” (Rennings et al., 2003, p. 14). Geels (2004, pp. 19-20) describes a 
system innovation as consisting of three important aspects: (1) technological substitution, which 
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includes the emergence and diffusion of new technology that replaces existing technology; (2) 
the co-evolution of technological and social systems, where both types of systems are 
continually interacting and changing; and (3) the emergence of new functionalities, where a new 
product or service provides a new functional characteristic. It follows that a “sustainable” system 
innovation would provide economic, environmental, and social benefits with the offering of new 
products, processes, or services. 
 
An important characteristic of research focusing on system innovation is the recognition that the 
relationships among sets of technologies are dynamic, complex, and nonlinear, and that these 
technologies are socially embedded. This focus supports the idea of dynamic, as opposed to 
static, efficiency and the importance of considering the fourfold co-evolution of technology, 
institutions, organizations, and society. Because the evolutionary economic and quasi-
evolutionary approaches to technological innovation (Box 1) make technology and innovation 
explicit and adopt a system approach, the frameworks developed to assess system innovation 
are built on these theories. Because neoclassical economic theory treats technology as 
exogenous, it does not provide fertile ground for considerations of system innovation. 
 
Briefly, evolutionary economics focuses on the process of technological innovation from the 
perspective of the survival of the fittest – that is, its roots are Darwinian and Schumpeterian [3] 
Nelson and Winter (1982, 1977) were the first to develop an economic theory in which the 
evolutionary theory of technological innovation was embedded. Their theory is based on two 
independent processes: variation and selection. In addition, because technology is treated as 
being socially embedded, the ideas of path dependency or lock-in and bounded rationality play 
important roles in the analysis of technological innovation. The evolutionary model of 
technological innovation was later extended by focusing on the sociological aspects of the 
evolutionary approach (Rip, 1992; van de belt and Rip, 1987). The so-called evolutionary 
approach treats the variation and selection of technology as non-independent events (Moors, 
2000). Thus, the focus is on how technological variations are influenced by the selection 
environment. 
 
The field of evolutionary economics is beginning to emerge as an important framework for 
understanding how modern economies work. Development is conceived as an evolutionary 
process. In general, evolutionary theory views innovation as a dynamic, interactive process of 
variation and selection where institutions and actors continually influence and learn from each 
other. 
 
Evolutionary theory has five important characteristics that differ from the neoclassical economic 
approach (Butter, 2002; OECD 1997). First, because the process of innovation is uncertain and 
is based on risk taking, there is no rational maximization behavior or optimal solution. 
Performance objectives can be achieved in many different ways through the creation of entirely 
new products, processes, or services. Thus, the selection of an optimal outcome using a 
specific form of technology ignores the possible emergence of new, disruptive ideas. Second, 
because innovation is a state of constant change and is not predictable, there is no one point of 
equilibrium. Third, technology is made explicit and is treated as a system of interacting sub-
technologies designed to achieve an overall objective. Fourth, innovation is made explicit as a 
dynamic and interactive process of variation and selection. Finally, the technological (or 
physical) and social (including institutions) structure of a system is made explicit. This enables 
economic performance to be considered as a function of the facilitating structure – that is, the 
infrastructure, institutions, financial system, geographic location, and other factors. 
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There are currently three important frameworks that can be used to develop initiatives to 
stimulate system innovation for sustainable transformations. Kemp (2002), Kemp, Loorbach, et 
al. (2007), and Kemp and Rotmans (2005) propose “strategic niche management” and 
“transition management” – a quasi-evolutionary approach – for achieving system changes 
necessary for sustainability. Butter (2002) suggests a three-layered approach for “green system 
innovation” based on a combination of evolutionary theory and national systems of innovation 
[4]. Ashford (2002c) argues for integrating rather than coordinating government interventions in 
order to bring about the needed technological, organizational, institutional, and social 
transformations to achieve significant sustainable system change. A role for government is 
anticipated by all three of these commentators, but to different degrees and in different ways. 
  
Strategic Niche Management and Transition Management 
 
The concept of strategic niche management (SNM) emerged from the two opposing views of the 
technological fix ideology (or technological optimism) and the cultural fix paradigm (Hoogma et 
al., 2002). The former argues that the benefits associated with technological progress are likely 
to far outweigh costs, and that a technological solution can be found to all problems. The latter 
suggests that the technology itself is actually part of the problem and that real solutions will 
have to come from social and cultural change. Therefore, SNM was created to “allow for 
working on both the technical and the social side in a simultaneous and coherent manner” (ibid., 
p. 3). 
 
Kemp (2002, p. 10) describes SNM as the “creation and management of a niche for an 
innovation with the aim of promoting processes of co-evolution.” The idea is that a new product 
will be used by real users (by society, industry, or government), and its use will promote 
interactive learning and build a product constituency. The underlying notion is that new 
technologies will be introduced in a socially embedded manner. It is important to realize that 
SNM is primarily focused on product innovation, not process innovation. However, its 
proponents argue that process innovation will be part of technological regime transformations 
(see the discussion of regime change below). SNM also enables institutions and organizations 
to adjust the technological development and deployment process to stimulate the adoption 
and diffusion of a new product. 
 
A key element of the SNM concept is that technological change occurs in a co-evolutionary 
manner – that is, technologies evolve within institutional networks. Saviotti (2005) suggests that 
two important general points can be made about the co-evolution of technologies and 
institutions: “First, the emergence of new technologies increases the division of labor in the 
economy, but in the meantime creates new coordination problems. One of the roles of co-
evolving institutions is to provide coordination. Second, although the firms producing and using 
the new technologies compete, other co-evolving institutions are in a complementary 
relationship with the main technology” (ibid., p. 30). Saviotti’s comments highlight the complexity 
that surrounds the introduction of a new technology and provide weight to Kemp’s arguments for 
the creation of protective niches in which promising technology can be tested and developed. 
The ability to experiment with new technology through demonstration projects that help users 
and suppliers learn about new possibilities is a vital component of SNM. 
 
The process of experimentation is likely to achieve one of two outcomes: regime optimization [5] 
or regime shifts [6]. These two outcomes can be described as sustaining or disrupting changes, 
respectively (see the earlier discussion). A technological regime is defined as “the whole 
complex of scientific knowledge, engineering practices, production process technologies, 
product characteristics, skills and procedures, established user needs, regulatory requirements, 
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institutions and infrastructures” (Hoogma et al., 2002, p. 19). In general, the type of technologies 
that are suitable for experimentation should be ones that hold the potential to bridge the gap 
between existing and new (sustainable) technological regimes (Kemp, 2002). This type of 
technology is referred to as “pathway technology.” In essence, SNM is a bottom-up, initially 
nondisruptive process where once the niche for experimentation has been established by 
government policy/regulation, the new technology form evolves from interactions among 
society, government, nongovernmental organizations, and industry. The emphasis is on 
multistakeholder governance rather than on government as the dominant actor. 
 
Transition management (TM) is a model of co-evolutionary management of transformative 
change in societal systems through a process of searching, learning and experimenting 
(Rotmans and Kemp, 2008) [7]. Managing means adjusting, adapting and influencing rather 
than using a command-and-control approach. There are persistent problems for which there are 
no immediate solutions. By transforming the persistent problem into a visionary challenge, TM 
explores a range of possible options and pathways through the carrying out of a diversity of 
small-scale experiments. Based on what is learned from these, the vision, agenda, and 
pathways are adjusted. Successful experiments are continued and can be scaled up, and failed 
experiments are abandoned, until convergence is reached. Rather than focusing on a single, 
available solution, TM explores various options and is aimed at guiding variation-selection 
processes into more sustainable directions, with the long-term aim of selecting the most 
sustainable option(s) and paths based on learning experiences. TM is meant to be a mutually 
supportive vehicle for both sociotechnical and policy changes.  
 
It is debatable whether Kemp’s description of the latter strategy will result in disrupting 
innovation. Kemp (2008, p. 374) acknowledges that “faced with sustainability problems, 
[incumbent] regime actors will opt for change that is non-disruptive from the industry point of 
view, which leads them to focus their attention on system improvement instead of system 
innovation.” Whether the concept could hold particular merit for system innovation in a specific 
context remains to be seen. If revolutionary change – or a technological regime shift – can occur 
via a stepwise system innovation process, SNM can be a useful tool that can be applied to 
large-scale engineering systems, such as the transportation system (Hoogma et al., 2002; 
Hoogma, Weber and Elzen, 2001), but that is a big “if.” It depends on, among other things, the 
extent to which incumbents dominate the process. 
 
Opponents of SNM argue that one of the shortcomings of the technique is that at some point the 
“probe and learn” ideology needs to become action and transformation, and Kemp’s theory is 
unclear on how transformation will occur (Smith, 2003). Further, if niches grow within or 
alongside existing regimes, they are unlikely to have radically different practices and rules, 
which raises the question whether the new products, processes, or services will offer significant 
benefits. A final point raised by Smith (2003) is the fact that the localization of niches may run 
against the nationalization or globalization ideology of mainstream government and business 
institutions. Thus, an important question is whether the “transformative potential” of SNM will be 
inhibited by these powerful forces (ibid.). 
 
Vergragt (2005) raises a slightly different concern from that of Smith (2003). He argues that if 
the role of government is to legitimize the transition process – including its own reform and the 
abolition of existing institutional and economic barriers to sustainable development – then a 
quandary exists because the national government may in fact be part of the problem rather than 
part of the solution. Therefore, an important question is who will manage the transition process. 
Quist and Vergragt (2004) also question whether an emerging niche market will survive once its 
protection mechanisms are removed. On the other hand, Grin et al. (2010, p. 83), in stating that 
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“[m]uch of the cited research focuses on explaining the limited success of the [SNM] 
experiments studied,” references Hommels et al. (2007, p. 85) who are described as arguing 
that “part of the problem might be that SNM focuses too much on providing protection.” 
 
In critiquing the TM approach, Tukker et al. (2008) comment that transition management of 
innovation neglects the role of the consumer and the importance of demand-side policies 
influencing consumption. It should be noted that regulation is a demand-side policy intervention; 
it defines the allowable characteristics and places constraints on the nature of products and on 
their manufacturing, use, and disposal. 
 
Dewulf et al. (2009), in analyzing transition management in the context of other theories of 
change management – especially intervention by government – question whether transition 
management is the “only model in town.” Dewulf et al. (2009, p. 12) observe that “a distinctive 
trait of transition management appears to be the assumption of an overarching position of 
(governmental) transition managers who can apply management tools, niche-building 
machinery, and engineering devices from a privileged, knowledgeable and external position ... 
towards a clear and one-dimensional target.” The government participates along with other 
stakeholders, rather than take a more directive role reminiscent of command-and-control 
regulatory involvement. The process is characteristically Dutch, using the so-called “polder 
consensus-seeking model.” Dewulf et al. (2009, p. 4) argue that transition management can 
take a relatively long time – twenty-five to fifty years – whereas collaboration theory in practice 
focuses on reaching an agreement and effectuating change in a few years’ time. Given the 
existence of relatively short-term “tipping points” in sustainability challenges, e.g., global climate 
disruption, endocrine disruption, and rapidly changing financial landscapes, the benefits of 
transition management may come far too late. Collaborative processes, of course, have their 
own drawbacks. 
 
Ashford (2002c) argues that although Kemp acknowledges that regulation can be a useful tool 
to stimulate radical (system) changes, his faith in the formation of strategic niches and stepwise 
change within the original technology regime is not likely to result in disrupting forms of 
technology that are necessary for sustainable development. The problem is that firms are likely 
to resist initiatives or regulations that threaten their market position and to focus instead on 
activities that maintain the status quo. Thus, a reliance on evolutionary or even co-evolutionary 
change rather than revolutionary change is not likely to support the emergence of new market 
entrants who play an important role in introducing radically different (and potentially more 
sustainable) forms of technology (Reinhardt, 1999). Berkhout et al. (2004) make a case similar 
to that of Ashford. They argue that the tendency of critical social groups has been to target the 
“incumbent regime, rather than its potential successor, ... represents a direct antithesis of the 
bottom-up niche-based model” (ibid., p. 61). The lesson appears to be that attempts at 
normatively-driven sociotechnical transitions (that is those forms most pertinent to the transition 
management project) do not follow exclusively the pattern described by the niche-based model, 
but instead imply much greater attention to macro-level processes (public opinion, government 
policy, the structure and scope of markets) and their capacity to influence and induce innovation 
at the micro- and meso-level. 
 
Jacob (2005), while generally supportive of decoupling economic growth from environmental 
degradation through ecological modernization, raises questions similar to those of Ashford and 
Berkhout et al. and asks whether SNM’s experimental arena is likely to capture and maintain the 
necessary political (and financial) support for a real transition. Further, Jacob (2005) argues that 
although “discourse and persuasion” are useful tools, they are unlikely to resolve any opposing 
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core beliefs held by the actors. Thus, bargaining and making trade-offs are likely to play an 
inevitable role in any decision-making and transition process. 
 
Finally, continuing from Smith’s (2003) earlier reservations about the ability of SNM to bring 
about the needed transformations, Smith and Kern (2007) comment on its limited success in 
energy policy in the Netherlands. They describe how Kemp and Rotmans persuaded the Dutch 
government to adopt SNM as a central strategy in its Fourth National Environmental Policy Plan 
(NMP4) in 2001. It should be noted, however, that the environmental successes of earlier Dutch 
National Environmental Policy Plans (NEPPs) were premised on the government setting clear 
future targets but negotiating ways of achieving those targets with stakeholders. The approach 
later adopted in its NEPP was to negotiate both targets and pathways with stakeholders. 
Existing industrial stakeholders may not represent the interests or capacity of future technology 
providers who are likely to displace them. 
 
The NMP4 focuses on restructuring production and consumption systems over a thirty-year 
period to achieve a reduction of one-twentieth in both resource and energy use. Smith and Kern 
(2007) describe and critique the SNM approach in the context of the Netherlands: 
 
By creating policies that support niche experiments in sustainability, whilst other policies 
place incumbent systems under concerted pressure to become sustainable, the 
transitions approach seeks to facilitate the transformation of systems ([citing] Smith, 
Stirling, et al. (2005)). The “S” curve moves the niche “pre-development” phase, through 
“take off” along an “acceleration” phase, and culminates in “stabilization” around the new 
structure of sustainable socio-technical practices ([citing] Rotmans et al. (2001b)). (Smith 
and Kern 2007, p. 6).  
 
[SNM] offers the prospect of reinvigorating ecological modernization without challenging 
cherished components. Thus, market-based instruments and win-win regulations, both 
advocated within ecological modernist discourse, remain key policy tools amongst a 
portfolio that can help guide transitions. The power of innovation to decouple 
environmental degradation from economic growth remains as a foundation. The 
dominant ecological modernization discourse is repackaged in the transitions approach 
[8]. (ibid., p. 7). 
 
Many commentators applauded this co-operative, long-term approach. ... Others were 
disappointed. The [NMP] plans interpreted ecological modernization technocratically. ... 
The plans were weakened by compromises within government and with business that 
translated into relatively undemanding targets. (ibid., p. 8). 
 
In our view, deeper, more profound envisioning exercise and transition debates will 
happen in civil society arenas, removed from the messy compromises of government 
and the economic imperatives of business. What the transitions discourse and ecological 
modernization lack is an account of how such initiatives become a power base for 
change. Neither identifies the social agents that can ensure the radical components of a 
discourse that can carry through to institutionalization. (ibid., pp. 18-19). 
 
A more sympathetic view of transition management is expressed by Meadowcroft (2005, p. 
486), who characterizes its proponents as appreciating the “regulatory dimensions” of 
technological evolution. Although he acknowledges that transitions under transition 
management may well take more than twenty-five years, that continued economic growth may 
be possible only at the expense of the environment, and that the role of government in solving 
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environmental problems has been underestimated, Meadowcroft (2005, p. 492) decries 
governments being “confined to a top/down and expenditure/regulatory framework” and puts 
some faith in transition management. More recently, Meadowcroft (2009) comments on the 
importance of addressing the politics surrounding the implementation TM toward sustainability 
goals. 
 
Shove and Walker (2007) provide four cautionary concerns: 
 
Transition managers’ efforts to develop and work towards shared societal or 
environmental goals are all very well but techniques like those of multi-stakeholder 
involvement in foresight exercises, or methods of public participation and deliberation 
are never “neutral” and never evacuated of power and strategic behavior. ... Initiatives of 
this kind can be experienced as processes of co-option, the effect of which is to neuter 
rather than embrace dissent. In addition, and in any event, it is important to remember 
that stakeholders’ visions of the future are always and inevitably shaped by the systems 
and social environments they inhabit today. (ibid., p. 765). 
 
Thoroughly systemic, thoroughly co-evolutionary models of social and environmental 
change undoubtedly challenge conventional approaches to problems of sustainability. In 
so far as they embody these ideas, strategies of transition management imply a 
necessarily radical overhauling of theory and orientation, but our caution is that such 
techniques can also be incorporated into political business-as-usual, albeit with a little 
more frequent revisiting of goals and a somewhat longer term horizon. (ibid., p. 767). 
 
How should those concerned with sustainability respond to the increasingly rapid, 
powerful and expertly orchestrated diffusion of unsustainable technologies, practices 
and images? Is the subtle modulation of reflexive governance capable of stemming and 
diverting unforeseen transitions of this kind, or are more robust counter measures 
required? (ibid.). 
 
[Concerning transitions in practice:] First ... there is almost no reference to the ways of 
living or to the patterns of demand implied in what remain largely technological 
templates for the future. Second, and because large-scale technological examples 
command so much attention, commentators take it for granted that policy and corporate 
actors are the key players – even if the involvement of other groups and interests is vital. 
... Third, the transition management literature consequently draws upon a narrow 
(perhaps necessarily narrow) slice of what is in fact a much wider debate about social 
systemic change. (ibid., p. 768). 
 
The publication of this critique stimulated a response by Rotmans and Kemp (2008) and a 
counter-response by Shove and Walker (2008), illustrating just how important the issue of 
transition management is becoming in the sustainability debate. 
 
In spite of initial reservations about the success of TM-inspired reincarnation of long-term policy 
design, some of its critics are cautiously optimistic about its future use (Shove, 2010; Voss, 
Smith and Grin, 2009). We, however, remain skeptical because (1) the time framework for 
success is far too long given the challenges of sustainable development, (2) there is too much 
potential for capture of future agendas by incumbents, even if they change somewhat, and (3) 
without clear and certain long-term targets characteristic of backcasting, long-term investments 
by new entrants leading to discontinuous change necessary for radical technological change are 
unlikely to be made. Backcasting in incremental steps is not long-term backcasting, and while it 
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introduces flexibility and mid-term corrections, it does not provide certain targets toward which 
to innovate. Again, we find it difficult to be optimistic that step-wise changes made toward 
uncertain futures involving incumbents will lead to radical, disrupting changes. Ecological 
modernization or reflexive governance arose historically because governments were not willing 
to exercise courage at setting long-term goals that challenge incumbent forces and agendas. 
Second generation policy design operating under the soft euphemism of accommodation and 
learning has serious weaknesses. 
 
In a more recent critique of the policy implications of SNM, Grin et al. (2010, p. 91) offer: 
 
The research discussed indicates that SNM is not a silver-bullet solution that will bring 
about transitions towards sustainable development, if only because experimenting will 
not be sufficient. SNM should be seen as a useful addition to existing policy instruments 
that have neglected the value of experiments. Other more traditional instruments for 
inducing sustainable innovation, such as market incentives, various forms of regulation 
and technology forcing also have to play a role. 
 
Finally, Grin et al. (2010, p. 84) distinguish the potential effectiveness of TM and SNM: 
 
We acknowledge that TM addresses some factors that SNM underplays. While SNM 
develops an evolutionary approach that builds on and leverages the dynamic forces of 
market competition, aimed at overcoming lock-in and promoting socio-technical diversity, 
TM suggests a more ambitious approach of goal-oriented modulation that places more 
emphasis on the role of strategic envisioning. In that respect, TM introduces the notion 
of “transition experiment” which is supposed to be different from regular innovation 
experiments (van den Bosch and Taanman, 2006). 
 
A Stronger Role for Government 
 
Government has an important role to play in creating winning forces and visions for sustainable 
transformations (Ashford, 2000, 2002c, 2005). Depending on the type of transformation 
required, the roles of government should encompass the following (Ashford 2002b, pp. 18-19): 
 
• “The direct support of R&D and incentives for innovation through appropriate tax 
treatment of investment; 
• the creation and dissemination of knowledge through experimentation and 
demonstration projects; 
• the creation of markets through government purchasing; 
• the removal of perverse incentives of regulations in some instances and the 
deliberate design and use of regulation to stimulate change in others; 
• the training of owners, workers, and entrepreneurs, and educating consumers;” and 
• the direct creation of meaningful, rewarding, and satisfying jobs. 
 
It should be clear how these roles relate to the ideas embedded in SNM and TM approaches, 
but we envision a much stronger role for government in stimulating technological innovation. 
Government should go beyond simply creating a favorable investment climate. “Without 
deliberate design, significant changes – even system changes – are unlikely to improve 
competitiveness, environment, and employment at the same time” (Ashford, 2002b, p. 18). As 
discussed in the next section, stringent regulation (focusing on environmental, health, and 
safety issues) is essential to stimulate significant technological changes, and such regulation 
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may in fact be necessary to create niches that facilitate the entry of new firms and organizations 
into a new market. 
 
Others who support the view that stringent (or “properly conceived”) regulation is necessary for  
environmental innovation include Foxon et al. (2004), Huber (2004b), and Jänicke (1990). For 
instance, Huber (2004a, p. 447) comments that “strict environmental performance standards ... 
[remain] by far the most effective controls instrument for environment and innovation alike 
(which is not astonishing given the fact that environmental standards are, or immediately 
translate into, technical standards).” Perhaps what is astonishing is the largely absent mention 
of government regulation in the SNM and TM literature. See Pelkmans and Renda (2014) for a 
recent review of the stimulating effects of regulation on innovation. 
 
Ashford et al. (2002) argue that an evolutionary (or incremental) pathway is insufficient to 
achieve factor ten or greater improvement in a system’s performance. Further, because 
changes in sociotechnical systems (such as the transportation or energy system) are difficult, 
the “creative use of government intervention is a more promising strategic approach for 
achieving sustainable industrial transformations than the reliance on the more neo-liberal 
policies relying on firms’ more short-term economic self-interest” (ibid., p. 10). Hence relying on 
Christensen’s (1997) approach to radical disrupting innovation is seen as being unlikely to result 
in “system” transitions toward sustainable development; however, disrupting forms of 
technological change are likely to continue.  
 
In addition, Ashford et al. (2002) state that governments should work with stakeholders to define 
future targets – while ensuring that their agendas are not captured by incumbent firms – and 
then use their position as trustee to “represent the future generations and the future 
technologies to ‘backcast’ what specific policies are necessary to produce the required 
technical, organizational, and social transformations” [9] (ibid., p. 10).  
 
It is likely that an evolutionary pathway is insufficient to achieve factor ten or greater 
improvements in eco- and energy efficiency and reductions in the production and use of, and 
exposure to, toxic substances. Such improvements require more systemic, multidimensional, 
and disruptive changes. We have already asserted that the capacity to change can be the 
limiting factor, and that this is often a crucial missing factor in optimistic scenarios.  
 
Successful management of disruptive product innovation requires initiatives and input from 
outsiders to produce the expansion of the design space that limits the dominant technology 
firms. Especially in sectors with an important public or collective involvement, like transportation, 
construction, and agriculture, this means that intelligent government policies are required to 
bring about necessary change.  
 
Rigid industries whose processes have remained stagnant also face considerable difficulties in 
becoming significantly more sustainable. Shifts from products to product-services rely on 
changes in the use, location, and ownership of products in which mature product manufacturers 
may participate, but this requires significant changes involving both managerial and social 
(customer) innovations. Changes in sociotechnical systems, such as transportation or 
agriculture, are even more difficult. Thus, as Ashford et al. (2002) argue, the creative use of 
government intervention may be a more promising approach to realizing industrial 
transformations than relying on shorter-term economic interests. 
 
This is not to say that enhanced analytic and technical capabilities on the part of firms and 
cooperative efforts and improved communication with suppliers, customers, workers, other 
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industries, and environmental/consumer/community groups are not valuable adjuncts in the 
transformation process. But in most cases, these means and strategies are unlikely to be 
sufficient by themselves for significant transformations, and they will not work without clear 
mandated targets to enhance the triple goals of competitiveness, environmental quality, and 
enhancement of employment/labor concerns. 
 
Government has a significant role to play, but the government cannot simply serve as a referee 
or arbiter of existing competing interests, because neither future generations nor future 
technologies are adequately represented by the existing stakeholders. And new stakeholders 
are only marginally likely to be brought into development by incumbents, notwithstanding the 
wishful thinking of SNM and TM advocates. 
 
Government should work with stakeholders to define far-future targets, but without allowing the 
incumbents to capture the agenda. It has to go beyond its historical focus on coordinating 
public- and private-sector policies. It must be multidimensional and directly address the present 
fragmentation of governmental functions. This means that the various policies must be mutually 
reinforcing and the targets must be clear.  
 
Regulation-Induced Innovation as an Alternative Pathway to Achieving Sustainable 
Development 
 
In a longer article the authors have argued that regulation – properly fashioned – can transform 
products and processes which confers both economic and health, safety, and environmental 
benefits as well as costs (Ashford and Hall, 2011a). In contrast, classical economic analysis of 
the relationship between health, safety, and environmental regulation and competitiveness 
maintains that stringent regulation increases production costs, diverting resources from R&D, 
and consequently hinders innovation. This assumption was challenged first in the late 1970s at 
MIT and made popular in 1991 by the so-called ‘Porter hypothesis’ (Porter, 1991; Porter and 
van den Linde, 1995). 
 
The Porter hypothesis and the relevant literature indicate that environmental, health, and safety 
regulation can induce dramatic innovations, not only by spurring the development of new 
products or services by incumbent producers, but also by creating conditions in which new 
producers can enter the field. Regulation can do this when firms have, or are induced to have, 
the willingness, opportunity, and capacity to innovate. This literature, and the insights gleaned 
from it, provide an important set of clues for how regulation can be used to foster sustainability. 
  
Based upon his research into the competitive advantage of nations, Porter (1991, p. 168) 
claimed that “[s]trict environmental regulations do not inevitably hinder competitive advantage 
against foreign rivals; indeed, they often enhance it. Tough standards trigger innovation and 
upgrading.” He observes, “[p]roperly constructed regulatory standards, which aim at outcomes 
and not methods, will encourage companies to re-engineer their technology. The result in many 
cases is a process that not only pollutes less but lowers costs or improves quality. … Strict 
product regulations can also prod companies into innovating to produce less polluting or more 
resource-efficient products that will be highly valued internationally” (ibid.). Porter‘s hypothesis is 
that firms which respond to stringent regulation by developing new technologies have a ‘first 
mover’ advantage and can capture the market for their products/services. Comparison of 
national competitiveness with good environmental governance and private sector 
responsiveness supports the Porter hypothesis. Good economic management and good 
environmental management are related and firms which succeed in developing innovative 
responses to environmental challenges benefit both environmentally and economically. 
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Earlier empirically based work on this concept, dates back twelve years before Porter‘s work to 
research undertaken at MIT (Ashford, Heaton and Priest, 1979; Ashford, Ayers and Stone, 
1985; Ashford and Heaton, 1983; Ashford, 1993). This earlier work showed how stringent and 
focused regulations in the U.S. chemical producing and using industries had the effect of 
stimulating fundamental product and process innovations. The MIT studies revealed that 
environmental and health and safety regulation – if appropriately designed, implemented, and 
complemented by economic incentives – can lead to radical technological developments that 
can significantly reduce exposure to toxic chemicals in the natural and working environments, 
and in consumer products. Examples include regulation-induced replacement of poly-
chlorinated biphenyls used in transformers by a silicone-based fluid, a new polymerization 
process for polyvinylchloride, and textile weaving innovation eliminating the need for a 
formaldehyde-containing resin that imparted permanent press properties to cloth.  
 
A limitation of Porter‘s hypothesis is that it focuses on how incumbent firms respond to more 
stringent regulations, but it ignores the important dynamics of new entrants (van de Poel, 2000). 
Porter and van den Linden (1995) argue that regulation, properly designed, can cause a 
regulated firm to undertake innovations that not only reduce pollution – which is a hallmark of 
production inefficiency – but also save on materials, water, and energy costs, conferring what 
Porter calls ‘innovation offsets’ to the innovating firm (and what Ashford and his MIT colleagues 
called ancillary benefits’). This can occur because the firm, at any point in time, is sub-optimal. If 
the firm is the first to comply with regulation in an intelligent way, other firms will later have to 
rush to comply and do so in a less thoughtful and more expensive way. Thus, there are ‘learning 
curve’ advantages to being first and early.  
 
Given Porter‘s focus on ‘innovation offsets’ – i.e., the cost savings due to induced innovation 
that could exceed the cost of the regulation (Porter and van den Linde, 1995) – he is mainly 
concerned with the costs to incumbent firms. However, it is possible to differentiate between 
‘weak’ and ‘strong’ forms of the regulation-induced innovation hypothesis – a distinction that 
Porter does not make. In its weak form, as Porter observes, firms subject to more stringent 
regulation respond with product and process innovations. However, while environmental and 
worker health and safety improvements may be realized, the offending products and processes 
are only incrementally changed. 
  
In contrast, in the strong form of the regulation-induced innovation hypothesis, stringent 
regulation can stimulate the entrance of entirely new products and processes into the market, 
thereby displacing dominant technologies. In this situation, unless incumbent firms have both 
the willingness and the capability to produce and compete with the new forms of technology, 
they too are likely to be displaced from the market (Christensen, 1997). The figure below 
provides a simple diagram of the likely technological responses to the strong and weak forms of 
the regulation-induced innovation hypothesis. Empirically-based examples were researched by 
Ashford and his colleagues in their work.  
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Figure 1: A model for regulation-induced technological change for ‘weak’ (Porter) and 
‘strong’ (Ashford/MIT) forms of the regulation-induced innovation hypothesis 
 
While some question whether environmental regulation does generate a positive effect on 
innovation (Robinson, 1995; Walley and Whitehead, 1994; Jaffe and Palmer, 1997), their 
analyses tends to miss the essence of the ‘strong’ form of the regulation-induced innovation 
hypothesis. Although it is likely that stringent regulation will not stimulate technological 
innovation in most firms, some firms are likely to rise to the challenge and become technological 
leaders in the process. Hence, the “evidence is necessarily anecdotal” (Ashford, 1999, p. 3). 
The Schumpeterian notion of ‘waves of creative destruction’ leading to succeeding advances in 
technological development describes the process by which dominant technologies are being 
continually displaced as new technologies become available.  
 
The design challenge facing government is how existing undesirable technologies can be retired 
(or displaced) through a combination of regulation and market incentives. These ideas thus 
challenge the notion that incumbent firms will reinvent themselves in a significant way and 
should have a major role in setting the targets for future regulation. Incumbents will not set 
targets they do not expect that they can meet.  
 
With regard to the ‘weak’ form of the regulation-induced innovation hypothesis, ambitious 
environmental policies in developed nations can lead to the formation of ‘lead markets’ for 
environmental technologies (Jänicke and Jacob, 2005). However, the evidence suggests that 
“the international diffusion of environmental innovations must be accompanied by international 
policy diffusion, or the adoption by other countries of the induced innovation must be 
economically reasonable” (Beise et al., 2003, p. 1). Both of these factors make it difficult to 
predict with certainty whether an ambitious environmental policy is likely to create a lead market 
for the international diffusion of innovations. The uncertainty surrounding the likely impacts on 
national industries of more stringent environmental [and health and safety] regulation is seen as 
one reason why governments hesitate to implement such policies (Blazejczak and Edler, 2004).  
 
Stringent regulation can stimulate new entrants to introduce entirely new products and 
processes into the market – products and processes that will displace dominant technologies. 
One of several vivid examples is the displacement of Monsanto‘s PCBs in transformers and 
capacitors by an entirely different dielectric fluid pioneered by Dow Silicone. Regulation can thus 
encourage disrupting innovations by giving more influence to new customer bases, in which 
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demands for improvements in both environmental quality and energy use and efficiency are 
more sharply defined and articulated. Of course, industries that would fear being displaced by 
new entrants would not be expected to welcome this regulation. This explains in part their 
resistance to regulation and their propensity to try to capture regulatory regimes, surreptitiously 
or through direct negotiation with government (Caldart and Ashford, 1999).  
 
In principle, regulation can be an effective and proper instrument for government to guide the 
innovation process. Well-designed regulation that sets new rules changes the institutional 
framework of the market. It can thus be an important element in creating favorable conditions for 
innovation that will enhance environmental sustainability and create incentives for the 
development of powerful lead-markets, which pull innovation towards that sustainability (Jänicke 
and Jacob, 2004). With regard to regulation, what seems to matter is not only the stringency, 
mode (specification versus performance standards), timing, uncertainty, focus (inputs versus 
product versus process) of the regulation, and the existence of complementary economic 
incentives, but also the inherent innovativeness (usually in new entrants) or lack of it (usually in 
the regulated firms) that the regulation engenders.  
  
In order for innovation to occur, the firm (or government itself) must have the willingness, 
opportunity/motivation, and capability/capacity to innovate (Ashford, 2000). These three factors 
affect each other, of course; but each is determined by more fundamental factors. 
  
Willingness is determined by (1) attitudes towards changes in production in general, (2) an 
understanding of the problem, (3) knowledge of possible options and solutions, and (4) the 
ability to evaluate alternatives. Improving (3) involves aspects of capacity building through the 
diffusion of information, through trade associations, government-sponsored education 
programs, inter-firm contacts, and the like. Changing attitudes towards changes in production 
(1) often depends on the attitudes of managers and on the larger culture and structure of the 
organization, which may either stifle or encourage innovation and risk taking. Factors (2) and (4) 
depend on internal intellectual capacities. In the context of disrupting innovation by firms 
representing the dominant technology, willingness is also shaped by the [rare] commitment of 
management to nurture new approaches that are at odds with its traditional value network or 
customer base.  
 
Opportunity and motivation involve both supply-side and demand-side factors. On the supply 
side, technological gaps can exist between the technology currently used in a particular firm and 
the already-available technology that could be adopted or adapted (known as diffusion or 
incremental innovation, respectively), or alternatively the technology that could be developed 
(i.e., significant sustaining or disrupting innovation). Consciousness of these gaps can prompt 
firms to change their technology, as can the opportunity for cost savings. Regulatory 
requirements can also define the changes that would be necessary to remain in the market. On 
the demand side, three factors could push firms towards technological change. These are (1) 
opportunities for cost savings or expansion of sales, (2) public demand for more 
environmentally-sound, eco-efficient, and safer industry, products, and services, and (3) worker 
demands and pressures arising from industrial relations concerns. The first factor could result 
from changes in the customer value networks. However, all these factors may stimulate change 
too late in the dominant technology firms, if new entrants have already seized the opportunity to 
engage in developing disrupting innovations.  
 
Capability or capacity may actually be the most important and limiting factor and can be 
enhanced by (1) an understanding of the problem, (2) knowledge of possible options and 
solutions, (3) the ability to evaluate alternatives, (4) resident/available skills and capabilities to 
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innovate, and (5) access to, and interaction with, outsiders. Knowledge enhancement/learning 
(2) can be facilitated through deliberate or serendipitous transfer of knowledge from suppliers, 
customers, trade associations, unions, workers, and other firms, and the available literature. 
The skill base of the firm (4) can be enhanced through educating and training operators, 
workers, and managers, on both a formal and informal basis, and by deliberate creation of 
networks and strategic alliances not necessarily confined to a geographical area, nation, or 
technological regime.  
 
Interaction with outsiders can stimulate more radical and disrupting changes. This last method 
of enhancing the capacity of firms to undertake technological change involves new ‘outsider' 
firms and stakeholders with which the firm has not traditionally been involved. Capacity to 
change may also be influenced by the innovativeness (or lack thereof) of the firm as determined 
by the maturity and technological rigidity of a particular product or production line (Ashford et al., 
1985; Ashford, 2000). Some firms find it easier to innovate than others. The heavy, basic 
industries, which are also sometimes the most polluting, unsafe, and resource-intensive 
industries, change with great difficulty, especially when it comes to core processes. New 
industries, such as computer manufacturing, can also be polluting, unsafe (for workers), and 
resource and energy intensive, although they may find it easier to meet environmental 
demands. Government should not miss the opportunity to loosen the creative forces that bring 
about innovative changes that can simultaneously benefit the economy, the environment, and 
the general welfare. 
 
The Importance of Diffusion in Achieving Sustainable Development 
 
Although technological innovation is crucial to achieve long-term sustainable development and 
fosters adaptive transformations, the preoccupation of scholars with innovation, in contrast with 
diffusion, may contribute to under-deployment or lack of development of policies that promote 
diffusion. The diffusion of technology is essential for enhancing sectoral and national revenues, 
as well as promoting more sustainable industrial, agricultural, transportation, and construction 
practices. There are many existing technologies that could contribute to the reduction of health, 
safety, and environmental problems and improve labor productiveness, but they either encroach 
on vested interests in maintaining current practices or may impose costs on firms, on 
consumers, or on both. In many cases, “environmental technologies” are process technologies 
rather than products and may confer proprietary benefits on their designers, who may not want 
others to have them. Environmental technologies are also difficult to organize into a market. 
 
The slow pace of widespread technology adoption (diffusion) is not due to the fact that the 
“discovery” of solutions to health, safety, and environmental challenges is lacking, nor is there a 
need for co-evolutionary approaches. Rather, what is missing is political and private-sector will 
for technology adoption. This may be as true for cleaner technologies as for so-called end-of-
pipe technologies. After all, if the health, safety, and environmental harms that come from a 
technology are not internalized in the price of a manufacturer’s activities, products, or services, 
why should he or she care if it is “cleaner”? Technology-diffusion forcing by government 
supported by significant demand by consumers, citizens, or workers through the tools of 
regulation, taxes, legislation, and stakeholder participation is likely to speed up the pace of 
change towards sustainable development. In sum, government needs to play a strong role in 
stimulating both disrupting innovation and the diffusion of technology. Otherwise, SNM and TM 
by themselves are likely to be too little and too late.  
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Box 1: Theories of Technological Innovation and the Role of Government 
 
Neoclassical economic approach: Technological development is exogenous, and technology is 
treated as a black box. Using this approach, a rational actor will attempt to maximize the 
production function. Government intervention corrects underinvestment by stimulating 
fundamental R&D and supporting universities. 
 
Evolutionary economic approach: Technological development is endogenous and is a path-
dependent process of variation and selection. Technology is described as evolving from a firm’s 
knowledge base. Technological development tends to occur along known directions, favoring 
path dependency and lock-in. The role of the government is to generate variation within an 
entrepreneurial climate that enhances innovation. 
 
Systems-of-innovation approach: Technological development is a process of interactive learning 
and includes not only R&D and knowledge production but also the transfer, exchange, and use 
of knowledge and the demand for knowledge. The aim of technological development is to 
optimize the use of knowledge generated by a system of related and linked actors. The role of 
the government is to maintain the institutional knowledge infrastructure of universities and 
research institutes. 
 
Industrial-networks approach: Technological development takes place in a process of 
interactions between actors who perform activities and have access to different resources. Thus 
technology (innovation) is the result of interactions between firms. No explicit attention is given 
to directing technological development. The role of the government is to build and renew local 
knowledge-intensive networks and to stimulate cooperation. 
 
Social constructivism approaches: Technological development is led by a process of social 
interaction that is directed by the values and beliefs of interest groups and actors (including 
government). The role of the government is to understand and articulate specific positions 
during negotiations and to develop networks that support social interaction. 
 
Quasi-evolutionary approach: Technological development is a process of co-evolution at 
different levels of analysis (micro, meso, and macro). Hence technology is an object in a co-
evolutionary learning process. The technological regimea guides, but does not fix, 
R&D activities. The role of the government is to influence the rules of a technological regime to 
facilitate learning processes among the various actors, and to establish niches of protected 
learning. 
 
Large-technical-systems approach: Technological development is the process of solving critical 
problems of a technical (or engineering) system. Technology is seen as part of an expanding 
technical system. Critical problems – or reverse salient – of the technical system have to be 
solved before the system can expand. The role of the government is to avoid causing or 
strengthening reverse salients and to reinforce the capacities or possibilities of system builders. 
 
Sources: Luiten (2001), Moors (2000), and Partidario (2003). 
 
a Rip and Kemp (1998, p. 340) define a technological regime as “the rule-set or grammar embedded in a complex of 
engineering practices, production process technologies, product characteristics, skills and procedures, ways of 
handling relevant artifacts and persons, ways of defining problems – all of them embedded in institutions and 
infrastructures.”  
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Notes: 
 
1. For an in-depth discussion of lock-in and path dependency, see Ashford and Hall (2011a). 
 
2. This concept has generated considerable academic and government interest. It was the 
subject of five annual international conferences, the latest held in Brighton, the UK in August of 
2015 entitled The International Sustainability Conference 2015, see 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/IST2015@sussex.ac.uk 
 
3. For an excellent discussion of evolutionary economics see Grin et al. (2010), Chapter I.3 and 
especially pp. 35-42. 
 
4. For a discussion of Butter’s approach see Ashford and Hall (2011b), pages 351-354. 
 
5. An example of regime optimization is the development/deployment of highly efficient vehicles 
that use the improved internal combustion engine as a base. 
 
6. Hoogma et al. (2002) provide the following examples of innovations that have regime-shift 
potential: battery-powered vehicles, telematics for traffic management, car sharing, smart cards, 
individualized self-service rental systems, dial-a-ride services, and bicycle pools. 
 
7. Kemp (2008, p. 375) comments: “The management of institutions can be done through the … 
use of three coordinating mechanisms: markets, hierarchy, and structure.” “The basic steering 
mechanism is modulation, not dictatorship or planning and control” (ibid., p. 377), and “The 
long-term goals for functional systems are chosen by society either through the political process 
or in a more direct way through a consultative process” (ibid.). Kemp endorses market-based 
instruments, and although he does not explicitly mention regulation, it is clear that he rejects a 
regulation as the main steering approach; this is in line with his commitment to evolutionary 
approaches and strong commitment to markets. This parallels the recent contribution of 
ecological economists Beddoe et al. (2009, p. 2488), who also ignore regulation as a 
mechanism to achieve sustain-able transformations and instead rely on cultural evolution to 
“push our society toward the adoption of institutions that best fit the new circumstances.” 
“Creating a sustainable future will require an integrated, systems level redesign of our socio-
ecological regime focused explicitly and directly on the goal of sustainable quality of life rather 
than the proxy of unlimited material growth” (ibid., p. 2483). 
 
8. Hey et al. (2007) and Jänicke and Jacob (2005) have been especially critical of relying on 
market-based instruments for achieving sustainable transformations, advocating, like Ashford, 
strong regulatory approaches. 
 
9. The backcasting approach enables policy makers to look back from a desirable future to 
create strategies that they hope will enable the future visions to materialize. This approach is in 
contrast to current planning processes that develop strategies based on forecasts. 
 
10. See the special issue of the Journal of Cleaner Production devoted to strategies for 
promoting diffusion (Montalvo and Kemp, 2008). 
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